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BIANNUAL SURVEY

the elimination of 3015(d), thus posing a question as to how
far this requirement was to go.
The second department answered the question recently in
Von Ludwig v. Schiano,5 5 where it held that the "itemization
of special damages may be obtained by a bill of particulars."
The omission from the complaint would only render a cause of
action insufficient where special damages are an integral part
of the cause of action itself, e.g., a prima facie tort. " (
CPLR 3017: Fiduciaryrelationship not necessary for an accounting?
An accounting has traditionally been a creature of equity. Lacking the appropriate equitable grounds, i.e., a fiduciary relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant, this remedy was unavailable
to plaintiff.
The appellate division has recently taken a more liberal approach to this problem. In Kamisky v. Kahn,15 the court
observed that it might grant a legal or an equitable remedy to
afford complete relief to a party. It appears, therefore, that the
lack of a fiduciary relationship will not impede the availability of
an accounting. Although there is no direct holding in Kaminsky
that an accounting may be granted in a law
action, the case
58
indicates a trend toward such a determination.
CPLR 3024(b): Motion to strike unavailable where material in
complaint is relevant at trial.
In Guiliana v. Chiropractic Institute,'"9 manipulation of the
plaintiff's spine by a student of the defendant Institute resulted in
severe injury. In the complaint, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, to
place in issue the lack of chiropractic skill and knowledge of the
student body of defendant Institute. In granting the defendant's
motion to strike those paragraphs under CPLR 3024(b), the
court quoted with approval the statement of a pre-CPLR case
that "matter, though possibly pertinent as proof, has no place
in a pleading if it is unnecessary to a statement of a cause of
action." 160

However, under CPLR 3024(b) a party may move to strike
any scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a
App. Div. 2d 789, 258 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1965).
see 7B McKI.NrzE's
CPLR 3015, supp. commentary 82 (1965).
157 23 App. Div. 2d 231, 259 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1965).
158For a further study of Kaminsky and its implication, see 7B
McKrNxET's CPLR 3017, supp. commentary 92 (1965).
15945 Misc. 2d 429, 256 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
16o Newton v. Livingston County Trust Co., 231 App. Div. 355, 362
N.Y. Supp. 121 (4th Dep't 1931).
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156 For a thorough discussion of this problem,
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pleading. Whether any matter is unnecessarily inserted is determined by the relevancy of the proof at trial. If the matter
would be admissible at the trial, it is not unnecessarily inserted,
even though it is scandalous or prejudicial. If plaintiff's assertions
in the complaint would be admissible at trial, they would be relevant
and therefore not subject to a motion to strike under CPLR
3024(b).
ARTICLE
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DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(c) and (d): "Material prepared for litigation" and
"attorney's work product."
Subdivisions (c) and (d) of CPLR 3101 have provided the
bar with an abundance of case law. Since the Surveys last installment, 16 ' there have been significant developments in the area
governed by these two subdivisions.
The ground work for judicial action
Prior to Finegold v. Lewis

162

and Kandel v. Tocher,1 1 3 there

had been a decided lack of uniformity in the judicial interpretation
of subdivisions (c) and (d) .164 Under these exclusionary provisions two questions of interpretation had frequently arisen before
the courts, viz., whether accident reports made by an employee
to his employer, and whether those made by an insured to his
insurer are proper subjects for disclosure. Prior to Finegold
and Kandel, the first department lower courts held statements by
an insured to his insurer to be proper material for disclosure,
whereas the lower courts of the second department reached conflicting decisions on the question of the discoverability of such
statements.
Speight v. Allen 16 5 followed the holdings of prior first department cases and held these statements to be outside the purview of
CPLR 3101(d). It relied heavily on the language employed by
the court in Rios v. Donovan 166 concerning the liberality to be applied in interpreting the CPLR and more specifically Article 31.
161 The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHNs L. REv.

406 (1965).
162 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
186322 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
164 Speight v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1072, 255 N.Y.S2d 918 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County
1965), discusses this conflict
1 5
6

Ibid.

App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964); discussed
in The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 178,
210 (1964), and 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR. 3120, supp. commentary 58 (1965).
Rios is a leading case delineating the scope of disclosure with which the
prartitioner should be well acquainted by now.
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